Emerging cyberphysical systems incorporate systems of systems that have functional interdependencies. With the increase in complexity of cyberphysical systems, the attack surface also expands, making cyberphysical systems more vulnerable to cyberattacks. We present a novel security architecture that localizes the cyberattack in a timely manner and simultaneously recovers the affected cyberphysical system functionality.
T he increased popularity of automated systems has resulted in the application of cyberphysical systems (CPSs) to many diverse domains, including the electrical power grid and systems such as automotive, smart home, and health care. Emerging CPSs integrate heterogeneous systems that have functional interdependencies. These integrated systems effectuate discrete functions and collaborate in an intricate fashion to perform the overall functionality of the CPSs. Modern CPSs are connected to the Internet and employ cloud-based infrastructure for their computational requirements. Moreover, the segments of a CPS systematically communicate with each other, and the field devices of a CPS are commonly provided with one or more interfaces for maintenance purposes. 2 Today, CPSs are capable of performing multiple diverse functions as compared to legacy systems. However, such capability can result in increased system complexity. From the systems engineering perspective, the increase in system complexity makes it more challenging to provide service guarantees. Similarly, from the security perspective, added complexity widens the attack surface. 3 The functional interdependencies among the systems further exacerbate the security risk. An attack initiated at one subsystem of a CPS can disseminate to others. This can result in a cascade effect of compromising one system after other and eventually impairing the functionality of whole CPS in a short amount of time.
Some CPS security frameworks mitigate the security risk by promptly patching the system components for newly discovered vulnerabilities, in addition to implementing strict authentication protocols for communication with the CPS. 4 This solution, based on the target-hardening concept, is proving to be less effective as reported cyberattack incidents indicate a continuous increase in sophistication. Another solution is based on the intrusion prevention approach, in which the security framework employs an intrusion detection system (IDS) that generates alerts when it identifies an anomaly in the workings of the CPS components. Intrusion prevention systems (IPSs), in addition to detection, can deploy some countermeasures, such as disconnecting the attacker's communication with the CPS and halting the operation of affected CPS components. 5 The performance of IPSs is tightly coupled with IDS efficiency. An IDS is usually evaluated in terms of false positive rate (FPR), false negative rate (FNR), and detection delay time. A high FPR indicates a significant number of false alarms that can effectuate an unpredictable IPS behavior, whereas a high FNR implies an ineffective IPS. Detection delay time is often given less importance in the performance evaluation of an IDS, but it has a significant effect on the operations performed by the IPS. Consider a scenario in which the intent of the attacker is to compromise as many CPS components as possible. The attacker orchestrates the attack by systematically compromising one component after another. The average time taken to compromise a component corresponds to the attack propagation speed, and the average time taken by the IDS to identify if a component has been compromised corresponds to the detection speed. If the attack propagation speed is more than the detection speed, then the attacker can continue to compromise the CPS components while the IPS will try to catch up until all of the target components are compromised. This catch-up process is evident when the attacker's strategy is to outpace the system's response mechanism rather than evade detection.
In this article, we present an integrated security architecture that combines the concepts of intrusion prevention and recovery to manage cyberattacks while maintaining a CPS's high operational availability. We also propose a novel multilevel partitioning mechanism that partitions the CPS components based on their functionality and damage containment requirements. The partitions help to contain the damage by localizing the cyberattack in the region of its inception. The response mechanism of the architecture effectively uses the partitions to counter attacks involving high attack propagation speeds as well. Finally, we have simulated an advanced metering infrastructure (AMI)-based pricing cyberattacks scenario and demonstrate the performance of the proposed architecture in terms of operational availability, damage extent, and average energy load (AEL) consumption.
AN INTEGRATED CPS SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
The proposed security architecture and its interaction with a general CPS framework is depicted in Figure 1 . The architecture has four constituent systems: partition manager (PAM), intrusion response system (IRS), intrusion recovery system (IRC), and performance monitor (PEM). The architecture uses the service of an IDS that generates alerts upon detecting a cyberattack. The architecture also uses the operational logs of the CPS and assumes that they are updated in real time with CPS component activities, that is, dataflow between components with a time stamp. Furthermore, it is assumed that the CPS logging system is part of its trusted computing base because correct functioning of the logging system is essential for the architecture's recovery operations. Implementing the core modules of the security architecture is nontrivial, but it can be standardized. The effort in the deployment of the security architecture is largely dependent on the available flexibility in interfacing with the CPS control system. We discuss the constituent systems of the architecture and their internal modules in detail, starting with the intrusion detection process.
IDS
Several intrusion detection techniques corresponding to different threat models exist in literature. IDSs employ diverse methods to identify the operational anomalies of the systems they are designed to protect. An IDS performs two major operations: collecting data and analyzing it to detect malicious activities. CPS-centric IDSs collect data by monitoring component activities or observing CPS network traffic. The detection techniques are either signature or behavior based. In the signature-based approach, the IDS looks for a malicious pattern to make detections. In the behavior-based approach, the IDS compares every new observation with normal system behavior it has learned during the data-collection phase. 6 Some IDSs also provide limited IPS capabilities, for example, snort 7 combined with a firewall configuration feature can filter any malicious traffic stream from a link. This technique of filtering out malicious traffic is referred to as negative filtering. It is also possible to perform positive filtering, in which only traffic meeting certain criteria is allowed. For our proposed architecture, we assume that an IDS is available and works across all layers of the CPS. We assume that the IDS can report the cyberattack type, start and detection times, and compromised components of the CPS. We also assume that the firewalls can be deployed on certain communication links of the CPS.
PAM
The PAM partitions the CPS components in two levels. The first level of partitioning involves the demarcation of intrusion boundaries (IBs). The objective of the IBs is to contain damage propagation across them. The second level of partitioning involves protection-zone formation. The objective of protection zones is that, within an IB, components affected by the attack need to be isolated quickly so that the impact of the attack is confined to affected components only.
IB demarcation
The CPS components that collaborate to provide a specific function are included in the same IB. A CPS component may handle multiple functions while the same component is shared among multiple IBs. An IB can encompass more than one function as well. To create IBs, the CPS topological structure and component to functionality mapping is used, and they are assumed to be available to the architecture. In Figure 2 , (a) shows AMI architecture, and (b) shows the division of AMI components in different IBs. The smart meters connected to the same data concentrator perform the meter_ops_ nan function and form a neighborhood area network (NAN). Therefore, they are part of the same IB. Similarly, the AMI components at the enterprise system layer, that is, the meter data management system (MDMS), consumer information system (CIS), outage management system (OMS), distribution management system (DMS), and geographic information system (GIS), are mapped to the global_meter_management function and can be placed in the same IB. The idea behind IBs is that an attack inside is fully contained in it by design. The communication among different IBs is carried out by dedicated links or, in some cases, through shared components. The inter-IB communication can be ensured to not be malicious by applying a positive firewall filter policy on its links or the outgoing traffic from the shared component. To minimize the firewall deployment overhead, the number of inter-IB communication links should be minimal. To find an optimal IB configuration, an optimization problem similar to the classical graph partitioning problem 8 can be formulated that minimizes the edge cut among IBs.
Protection-zone formation
IBs can contain thousands of CPS components, and an attack starting from a single component can potentially compromise all of the components in that IB due to functional dependencies. Figure 2(c) shows an example AMI topology enclosed in an IB. To contain the damage within an IB, we introduce a second level of partitions known as protection zones. The PAM groups CPS components of an IB in almost fixedsize protection zones such that the chances of inter-protection-zone damage propagation are minimized. The response system of the architecture utilizes the protection-zone information to effectively localize the damage in an IB. The protection-zone creation process is formulated as a single-objective, multiple-constraints, optimization problem with the goal to minimize the inter-protection-zone communication.
The CPS components in an IB and the interconnections among them can be modeled as an unweighted nondirectional graph P, as shown in 
, that is, Q i is the set of neighboring subgraphs that contain a vertex u adjacent to v ∈ P i , whereas there exists an edge e(v, u) between u and v. The problem is to partition the graph P into k balanced subgraphs with minimum edge cut such that a vertex at the boundary of a subgraph is at most connected to 1 + η other subgraphs. Let ⊗ ij ={e(v i , v j )|v i ∈P l and v j ∈ P k , ∀k ≠ 1}, that is, ⊗ ij is the set of edges extending from one subgraph to another. The optimization problem is as follows:
The objective function minimizes the number of communication links between two different subgraphs or protection zones. The damage propagates through the communication links between CPS components; therefore, minimizing the communication across protection zones reduces the chances of inter-protection-zone damage propagation. Moreover, constraint (2) balances the sizes of the partitions because small-sized partitions cannot restrict the damage spread in one protection zone, and large-sized partitions allow damage to propagate to a large number of CPS components without any hindrance. Constraint (3) ensures that a CPS component in a protection zone is at most connected to components in 1 + h protection zones. The intuition is that if a component connected to components in many different protection zones is attacked, then damage could quickly propagate to other protection zones. Parameters f and h are used to relax the constraints. The lower the values of these parameters, the better expected performance is in terms of damage containment; but usually if the constraints are too tight, there might not be a feasible solution for a given CPS topological structure. This graph decomposition problem is similar to the classical uniform graph partitioning problem, 8 and the PAM employs a greedy algorithm to create protection zones (partitions) of similar sizes.
The PAM maintains information about the respective member components of protection zones and the boundary components of all protection zones. A CPS component that has connections to components in other protection zones is a boundary component. Figure 2(d) shows the creation of protection zones within an IB for AMI as an example CPS.
IRS
The IRS is activated by the IDS upon the detection of an intrusion. The IRS generates a response for the cyberattack by using the information provided by the IDS and PAM. The functionality of the IRS is described as follows.
The damage assessment (DA) module uses protection-zone information provided by the PAM to identify the protection zones where damage has been spread. The PAM shares two data structures with the DA module. The first one maps every CPS component to a protection zone and is named pz_component_ list. The second data structure contains information about the boundary components of the protection zones and is named pz_boundary_set. The IDS detects intrusions in the CPS and generates alerts that specify which CPS components are compromised. The following pseudocode describes the damage assessment process:
Input: pz_component_list, pz_boundary_set, ids_alert Output: response_set 1. for each ids_alert of a corrupted CPS component 2. use pz_component_list to find the protection-zone P to which the corrupted component belongs 3. identify the boundary components of P using pz_boundary_set 4. include the identified boundary components in response_set For each alert received by the DA module, response_set is computed. The components that need to be isolated from the rest of CPS are in the response_set. It is possible that, by the time the IDS detects an intrusion, the damage has already spread to other protection zones. In that case, the IDS keeps generating alerts as more CPS components get compromised, and the DA module keeps generating response_sets and provides them to the response manager (RSM) module until the damage is contained.
Response Manager. The RSM coordinates the operations of DA and interfaces with the CPS control system. The RSM starts its operations the moment it receives an alert from the IDS. First, the RSM halts the operation of the compromised components. Subsequently, it sends instructions to the CPS control system to disconnect the CPS components identified in response_set. The goal here is to stop inter-protection-zone damage propagation. This action might temporarily halt certain CPS functions, resulting in their being briefly unavailable in exchange for the benefit of damage containment. The RSM continues this process until there are no more alerts from the IDS, indicating the damage has been successfully contained. Subsequently, the RSM activates the IRC to start the recovery process. Additionally, the RSM sends IRS operational information to the PEM.
IRC
The IRC recovers the system in an automated fashion by determining the exact extent of damage and performing corrective actions accordingly. The architecture responds first and recovers afterward because the recovery is a time-consuming process, whereas response can be deployed quickly after the detection of the cyberattack. We explain the functions of several IRC modules briefly.
Recovery Analysis. The recovery analysis (RA) module assesses the extent of damage by precisely identifying the compromised components of the CPS. For an IDS alert, the recovery process is initiated after completing the response process. The RA module analyzes the CPS operational logs, which contain detailed information about the activities of CPS components. The activity of interest is usually the dataflow information between CPS components. The RA module uses the IDS alert information to find the start time of the cyberattack (T s ) and the compromised CPS component. The RA module then starts analyzing the CPS operational log to identify all of the components to which the compromised component communicated and includes them in a data structure known as repair_set. The RA process is described in the following pseudocode: It can be observed in the pseudocode that the RA module generates the repair_set by bui lding a causa lit y re l at ion sh ip between components using intercomponent communication information. Recovery Protocol Knowledge Base. Once the RA module identifies the compromised components, the recovery protocol knowledge base (RPK) module determines the recovery protocol to recover them. The RPK module maintains a knowledge base that provides procedures that need to be followed to recover the compromised CPS components. For example, if the data management server is compromised, then the recovery techniques mentioned in Liu 9 can be employed. Similarly, if a field device is compromised, then a redundant device could be activated, if available. Otherwise, if the device was providing essential data to a controller, then instructions can be given to the controller to use simulated data till the device is restored manually.
Recovery Manager. Similar to the RSM, the recovery manager (RCM) interfaces with the CPS control system. The RCM submits recovery instructions to take corrective actions based on the information provided by the RPK module for a particular attack. Notice that the RCM might not be able to completely recover the CPS functionality in an automated manner due to limitations of the CPS infrastructure or unavailability of the appropriate recovery protocol in the RPK for a particular component. In that case, the RCM only disables the corrupted component and generates an alert to recover the system manually. Once the system's recovery process is complete, the normal communication of all of the CPS components is restored. The RCM also records the activities of the IRC and forwards this information to the PEM.
PEM
The PEM provides an overview of response and recovery system performance by collecting statistics from the IRS and IRC and calculating different performance metrics. The PEM has two modules that are discussed briefly.
Statistics Collection. Information from different systems of the proposed security architecture is collected and analyzed by the statistics collection module. The received information can be in the form of extensive log files; therefore this module extracts helpful data that is used by the metrics calculation module.
Metrics Calculation. We introduce operational availability (~) as a measure of serviceable CPS functions and derive damage extent (d) from ~ that reflects the impairment of the CPS functions caused by an attack. The metrics are defined as follows: › Operational availability: the available CPS functionality in terms of percentage of components unaffected in an attack for a CPS function. › Damage extent: the compromised CPS functionality in terms of percentage of components damaged in an attack for a CPS function.
Note that these metrics concern a particular CPS function. The overall CPS availability and damage extent can be found by averaging the metric for all CPS functions. Also note that we can compute one metric from the other by subtracting the known metric value from 100.
SIMULATIONS AND EVALUATION
We have used AMI as the target CPS application to evaluate the performance of the proposed security architecture. We first discuss the threat model concerning AMI, followed by a discussion on the simulation tool and implementation of the proposed architecture. Finally, we present our experimental setup and compare the performance of the proposed architecture with the commonly adapted intrusion prevention approach.
Threat model and implementation
We have employed the electricity pricing manipulation cyberattacks on AMI as the attack scenario in our experiments. The attacker tries to exploit access vulnerabilities of smart meters through a direct physical link or through the AMI. The attacker's objective in an electricity pricing manipulation cyberattack is to disrupt the power grid's distribution system such that electricity supply to the targeted regions is suspended. The attacker maliciously gains access to a smart meter and usually injects malware that could be propagated through the network. Such cyberattacks can be detected by modeling the state of each meter in a distributed fashion with a centralized decision-making mechanism. 10 In AMI, smart meters are connected to the data concentrator through a mesh network that forms a NAN. The target of the malware is the guideline price information used by the smart controller to manage the usage of different appliances to reduce the electricity bill. The smart controller, when it observes a lower price at a certain time of the day, schedules the usage of many appliances, resulting in the increase in energy consumption of that particular consumer.
The consumers in a NAN are usually connected to the same bus used by the distribution system of the power grid. If the attacker succeeds in manipulating the pricing information in a large number of smart meters one after the other, the transmission line that delivers power to the bus can trip. This can cause the transmission system to reallocate power distribution to other transmission lines connecting the bus, which, in turn, can trip due to excessive load. This results in a cascading failure, and the community connected to the bus can be without power. This disruption in a distribution system generally doesn't stay within a community because, from the generation system to the consumers, power flows through transmission lines linked to several buses, and a total blackout can occur.
To simulate this scenario, we have used SecAMI, 11 an open source simulator developed to study the impact of cyberattacks on AMI. SecAMI can be used to perform two operations: first, an AMI topology involving smart meters and data concentrators can be created as an undirected graph, and second, an attack on the created topology can be simulated that compromises one node (smart meter) after the other according to three simulation parameters-compromise time of a node (ct), hop time from one node to another (ht), and detection time of a compromised node (dt). These parameters determine the attack propagation speed with respect to the detection speed in the simulation.
We have modified SecAMI to implement the protection-zone aware response mechanism of the architecture. To create protection zones for a given AMI topology, we have built a partitioning module on top of SecAMI that takes a parameter k and a topology graph as inputs to create k protection zones of equal sizes. The partitioning module maintains information about the members of a protection zone and boundary components of the created protection zones. The proposed security architecture's response mechanism uses the protection-zone information to identify the protection zones whose member components are detected to be compromised. Subsequently, it immediately halts the communication of the boundary components of the under-attack protection zones from the rest of the AMI topology.
Experimentation and results
To evaluate the performance of the proposed security architecture in terms of damage containment, we have conducted several experiments. The variable parameters in the experiments are the size of the topology in terms of number of nodes (n), the compromise to detection time ratio (v = ct/dt) that specifies the attack propagation speed with respect to detection speed, and the partitioning parameter (k) that specifies the number of protection zones for a given topology. The performance of the proposed architecture is measured in terms of three metrics. The first two are aforementioned general CPS damage-containment evaluation metrics, that is, ~ and d. The third metric is AEL that is specific to AMI and power grid analysis.
In our experiments, we consider attacks on function 1: meter_ops_nan1, that is, in IB 1 in Figure 2(b) . Because only one function is considered, ~ is the percentage of components unaffected in the attack, and d is the percentage of components compromised in the attack. For AEL, we assume that each smart meter in the topology is connected to a medium-sized household with standard appliances like a washing machine, dishwasher, and so on. The smart controller of each consumer schedules the energy consumption for next 24 h based on the guideline pricing information. The quadratic pricing model presented in Liu et al. 12 is employed to form the normal guideline price and energy consumption for a general household.
The value of ~ for different values of n with σ = 3 and k = 0, 8 is shown in Figure 3 (a). It can be seen that the performance of the proposed partition-driven architecture (k = 8) is considerably higher as compared to the nonpartitioned system (k = 0); for example, at n = 200, the value of ~ is 84.5 for the partitioned system, whereas its value is 7.4 for the nonpartitioned system. Moreover, note that the value of ~ increases as the value of n increases until 200 nodes after that it decreases. This is due to the fact that there exists an optimal protection-zone size that maximizes the benefit. If the size of the protection zone is too small, it is more likely that damage will propagate to other protection zones. If the size is too large, then many member nodes of the protection zone can become corrupted without any hindrance. Figure 3(b) shows the values of δ for 200-node topology for different v and k values. Notice that even when the attack propagation speed is high, that is, lower values of v, the partitioned system (k >0) can effectively contain damage relative to the nonpartitioned system (k = 0). For higher v values, there is ample time for the response mechanism to react, and hence the performance of the partition-driven architecture is significantly better. Figure 3(c) shows the manipulated guideline price values in a smart meter. 10 This change in guideline price increases the energy consumption of a consumer by 1.3 kWh on average in our simulations. Figure 3(d) shows the increase in overall demand by all of the customers corresponding to 200node topology for nonpartitioned (k = 0) and partitioned systems (k = 8). It can be noted that the partition-driven architecture efficiently handles the attack, and correspondingly, load on the transmission lines connected to the bus connecting 200 consumers is not drastically increased in comparison to the nonpartitioned system. T he partition-driven security architecture presented in this article proposes a comprehensive security solution for CPSs. The proposed architecture is able to contain the damage propagation and recover the CPS automatically. However, there are several challenges that must be addressed to develop a robust security solution for CPSs. These include dealing with the performance of IDSs and evaluation of the proposed security architecture for more complex attacks.
